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LINCOLN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION,  
AND EXECUTIVE POWER 
HENRY L. CHAMBERS, JR.∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
One hundred and fifty years after President Abraham Lincoln signed 
the Emancipation Proclamation, the debate regarding the President’s consti-
tutional authority to issue the Proclamation is no less interesting than it was 
when the Proclamation was first read.1  Though the ratification of the Thir-
teenth Amendment substantially mooted the need to determine the Procla-
mation’s constitutionality, thorny questions remain regarding President 
Lincoln’s executive authority to issue the Proclamation.2  Often, the debate 
focuses on the President’s commander-in-chief power; however, a relatively 
broad vision of this power effectively ends the discussion.3  In the context 
of the Civil War, the commander-in-chief power focuses on the President’s 
power to act extraordinarily in extraordinary circumstances.4  The constitu-
tional question becomes whether the commander-in-chief power allowed 
President Lincoln to act outside of the Constitution’s structure of separation 
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 1.  The constitutionality of the Emancipation Proclamation remains subject to debate.  See 
Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the Emancipation Proclamation 
Constitutional: Do We/Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135, 1148–49 
(2001) (noting three options regarding the constitutionality of the Emancipation Proclamation: it 
was constitutional because its scope was limited; it was constitutional because Lincoln had nearly 
unlimited power to issue it; or it was unconstitutional). 
 2.  By outlawing slavery in the United States, the Thirteenth Amendment rendered the con-
stitutionality of the Emancipation Proclamation largely academic.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see 
also Paul Finkelman, Lincoln, Emancipation, and the Limits of Constitutional Change, 2008 SUP. 
CT. REV. 349, 349 (noting that the Civil War and Thirteenth Amendment eclipsed any legal sig-
nificance the Emancipation Proclamation might have had in 1863).   
 3.  U.S. CONST. art. II § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States . . . .”).  See John Yoo, Review, Unitary, Executive, or Both?, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1935, 2005–06 (2009) (discussing arguments supporting and criticizing President 
Lincoln’s use of his commander-in-chief power). 
 4.  See id. at 2006 (discussing President Lincoln’s broad use of his commander-in-chief 
power to “respond[] to a crisis that threatened the very life of the nation”). 
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of powers and checks and balances during the Civil War.5  The issue of the 
Emancipation Proclamation’s constitutionality can then be narrowed fur-
ther, to whether the Proclamation was calculated to help the Union win the 
Civil War.  Not only was the Emancipation Proclamation calculated to help 
the war effort, it did.6 
Rather than consider President Lincoln’s power to issue the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation as Commander in Chief, this Essay focuses on a different 
segment of the President’s executive authority: the Take Care Clause.7  
Specifically, it considers whether President Lincoln was authorized to issue 
the Emancipation Proclamation based on his responsibility to “take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.”8  If President Lincoln’s take care duty 
authorized him to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, the Proclamation 
can be seen as a historic and momentous document issued consistent with 
the Executive’s normal constitutional power, rather than one that was justi-
fied only by the enormous power claimed by President Lincoln as Com-
mander in Chief in the context of the Civil War.9 
The suggestion that the Emancipation Proclamation may have been de-
fensible as a standard executive order runs contrary to some accepted con-
stitutional and historical wisdom.10  Indeed, the Emancipation Proclamation 
is considered by some to be a great American document precisely because it 
                                                          
 5.  See id. at 2005 (noting claims that Lincoln’s exercise of executive power, including the 
commander-in-chief power, was outside of constitutional limits).  Indeed, the commander-in-chief 
power can crowd out legislative power, though Congress attempted to keep a hand in war policy 
during the Civil War.  See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 18 
(1963) (“Congress was determined to take steps to demonstrate its authority in the conflict in other 
ways.”).  
 6.  The Emancipation Proclamation helped the Union sustain itself domestically and interna-
tionally.  See Jason A. Adkins, Lincoln’s Constitution Revisited, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 211, 247 
(2009) (“Lincoln believed that slave emancipation was a necessary military measure to deprive the 
South of both resources and troops.”); WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, MR. LINCOLN & THE NEGROES 54 
(1963) (“He issued the Proclamation as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy in an effort to 
weaken the enemy.  The Commander in Chief could blockade the ports of the enemy to keep sup-
plies from reaching him.  By the same reasoning, he was entitled to weaken the South by freeing 
its slaves and robbing it of manpower.”); see also DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 
153 (2003) (noting the argument that emancipation might help keep European countries neutral, 
thereby helping the Union cause).   
 7.  U.S. CONST. art. II § 3. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  See infra Part III. 
 10.  See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 685 (1952) (Vinson, 
C.J., dissenting) (“The most striking action of President Lincoln was the Emancipation Proclama-
tion, issued in aid of the successful prosecution of the War Between the States, but wholly without 
statutory authority.”); Levinson, supra note 1, at 1144–45 (discussing Supreme Court Justice Cur-
tis’s pamphlet entitled “Executive Power,” which argued that the Emancipation Proclamation was 
unconstitutional). 
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required that President Lincoln act boldly and courageously, and possibly 
outside of his constitutional comfort zone.11  That vision of the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation, however, essentially ignores legislation regarding slaves 
and slavery that Congress passed between the start of the Civil War and the 
issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation.12  During that time, in each law 
that addressed slaves and slavery, Congress moved toward freeing slaves 
and limiting slavery.13  Congress also indicated a willingness to emancipate 
various groups of slaves as war policy.14  Indeed, those laws gave the Presi-
dent the power and duty to seize and liberate the property, including slaves, 
of those who were engaged in war against the United States or were disloy-
al to the United States.15  President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proc-
lamation against that legislative backdrop.  Given such legislation, Presi-
dent Lincoln may have had the constitutional authority to issue much of the 
Emancipation Proclamation under his take care authority.16 
This Essay explores whether President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proc-
lamation, freeing all slaves held in areas designated by the President to be 
under rebellion on January 1, 1863, could be justified as an exercise of his 
power under the Take Care Clause.  Part I of this Essay discusses the legis-
lation that preceded the Emancipation Proclamation.  Part II discusses the 
Emancipation Proclamation.  Part III discusses the Take Care Clause and 
how it might authorize significant parts of the Emancipation Proclamation, 
if not the entire document. 
                                                          
 11.  See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 350 (noting Lincoln’s concerns over the constitutionality 
of the Emancipation Proclamation); ALBERT A. WOLDMAN, LAWYER LINCOLN 333 (1936) (not-
ing Lincoln’s cautious approach to the constitutionality of emancipation).  The document may 
have been dry and legalistic as a result.  See Levinson, supra note 1, at 1140 (suggesting that the 
limited reach of the Emancipation Proclamation could be due to Lincoln’s desire to stay loyal to 
the Constitution); Yoo, supra note 3, at 2013 (“Lincoln’s dependence on his constitutional au-
thority explains the Emancipation Proclamation’s careful boundaries.”).  
 12.  See infra Part I.  Some historians have argued that the Emancipation Proclamation had 
very little practical effect.  See, e.g., Robert Fabrikant, Emancipation and the Proclamation: Of 
Contrabands, Congress, and Lincoln, 49 HOW. L.J. 313, 314 (2006) (“As a legal matter, the Proc-
lamation had little, if any, emancipatory value, and to the extent it had legal vitality, it was largely 
redundant with legislation already passed by the Civil War Congress.”). 
 13.  See infra Parts I.A–C. 
 14.  See, e.g., Fabrikant, supra note 12, at 327 (“The [First Confiscation Act] raised the spec-
ter that the federal government would destroy slavery as a means of winning the War.”).  Of 
course, Congress has the latitude to set war policy in a number of ways.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8 (providing Congress the responsibilities to declare war, raise an army and navy, and make 
rules and regulations for the armed forces); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 643–44 
(Jackson, J. concurring) (discussing Congress’s broad constitutional authority to set war policy).  
 15.  See infra Parts I.A–C. 
 16.  See infra Part III.B. 
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I.  PRE-EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION CIVIL WAR LEGISLATION 
In the antebellum era, Congress adamantly refused to legislate regard-
ing slavery in the states.17  The issue was deemed a state prerogative on 
which Congress had little or no constitutional authority.18  The Civil War, 
however, triggered wartime legislation that directly and indirectly affected 
slaves and slavery.19  The slavery-related legislation passed between the ad-
vent of the Civil War and the Emancipation Proclamation’s issuance was 
wide-ranging.20  Some legislation focused on ensuring that slaves were not 
used against the Union.21 Some legislation directed the emancipation of 
slaves who directly supported or fought for the Union cause.22  Some legis-
lation outlawed slavery in certain parts of the Union.23  Though specific 
laws may have applied to a discrete group of slaves or a particular swath of 
the United States, when taken as a whole, Civil War legislation passed be-
fore the Emancipation Proclamation was issued makes clear that Congress 
was willing to move toward emancipation as a war measure, and more gen-
erally.24 
                                                          
 17.  Indeed, for a time, Congress refused to discuss slavery.  See Michael Kent Curtis, The 
Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835–37, 89 
NW. U. L. REV. 785, 848–49 (1995) (discussing the antebellum “gag rule” that effectively barred 
discussion of slavery petitions in the House of Representatives). 
 18.  See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 352–54 (noting the accepted limitations during the Civil 
War era on how the federal government could address slavery in the states); JAMES G. RANDALL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 350–51 (1951) (noting that Lincoln maintained 
“that Congress had no constitutional power to overthrow slavery in the States”); Sandra L. Rier-
son, The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolution, 35 VT. L. REV. 765, 836 (2011) (not-
ing that even radical abolitionists did not argue that the federal government could outlaw slavery 
in the states). 
 19.  See infra Parts I.A–C; see also RANDALL, supra note 18, at 343 (“When the Civil War 
came, however, it was widely believed that the Government acquired a power in this field which 
in peace times it did not have.”). 
 20.  See HENRY W. WILBUR, PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S ATTITUDE TOWARDS SLAVERY AND 
EMANCIPATION 54–59 (1970) (discussing the variety of legislation passed between the advent of 
the Civil War and the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation); see generally HENRY WILSON, 
HISTORY OF THE ANTISLAVERY MEASURES OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH AND THIRTY-EIGHTH 
UNITED STATES CONGRESSES, 1861–64 (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1864) (discussing antislavery 
legislation). 
 21.  See infra Part I.A. 
 22.  See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 23.  See infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
 24.  This is in marked opposition to the final efforts to avoid disunion just before the Civil 
War began.  See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 732 n.261 (2011) (“In 1861, in a last-ditch attempt to pre-
vent more Southern states from seceding, Congress proposed, President Lincoln endorsed, and 
three states ratified a constitutional amendment (known as the Corwin amendment) that made ex-
plicit Congress’s lack of power to interfere with or abolish slavery in any state, and that prohibited 
any subsequent constitutional amendment to the contrary.”); Rierson, supra note 18, at 847 (“The 
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A.  The First Confiscation Act 
Passed soon after the First Battle of Bull Run, the First Confiscation 
Act was signed by President Lincoln on August 6, 1861.25  The Act provid-
ed that property, including slaves, used to support “the present or any future 
insurrection against the Government of the United States” would be “lawful 
subject of prize and capture.”26  The Act had a context.  In May 1861, soon 
after the beginning of the Civil War, General Benjamin Butler was faced 
with deciding what to do with runaway slaves who had appeared at Fortress 
Monroe, where Butler was in command.27  After learning that the slaves 
had been used in service of the Confederacy—building encampments and 
providing other valuable labor to the rebel cause—Butler declined to return 
the slaves to Major M.B. Carey, the emissary who the slaves’ owner, Colo-
nel Charles Mallory, had sent to retrieve them.28  Butler had offered to re-
turn the slaves if Mallory would appear at Fortress Monroe and pledge loy-
alty to the Union.29  Mallory never appeared; Butler declared the slaves to 
be contraband of war and declined to return them.30  Rather than allow 
those slaves to rejoin their Confederate master, Butler decided to use them 
                                                          
efforts of the President and of Congress to entice the southern states back into the Union with 
promises of non-interference with slavery obviously failed.  As the prospect of secession and civil 
war became a stark reality, the President and his party began to gradually move towards the aboli-
tion of slavery.”); WILBUR, supra note 20, at 44–46 (discussing Congress’s various attempts to 
placate the South and avert war beginning in December 1860).  Indeed, Lincoln personally at-
tempted to avoid disunion.  See WOLDMAN, supra note 11, at 287–88 (noting that Lincoln’s First 
Inaugural Address struck a conciliatory note with the South regarding slavery).   
 25.  An Act to confiscate Property used for Insurrectionary Purposes, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319 
(1861) [hereinafter First Confiscation Act].  Both the Union and the Confederacy passed confisca-
tion acts in the first year of the Civil War.  See BURRUS M. CARNAHAN, ACT OF JUSTICE: 
LINCOLN’S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AND THE LAW OF WAR 90–92 (2007) (discussing 
Confederate confiscation acts); RANDALL, supra note 18, at 275–76 (discussing Confederate con-
fiscation acts passed before and after the First Confiscation Act). 
 26.  First Confiscation Act, supra note 25, § 1.  Congress clearly had the power to pass such 
legislation.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing Congress power to “make Rules concerning 
Captures on Land and Water”).  
 27.  CARNAHAN, supra note 25, at 84.  Butler had addressed issues surrounding the runaway 
slave issue during his service in Maryland.  Butler, a lawyer, had argued that slaveowners in Mar-
yland should have their rights to slaves protected because Maryland had remained in the Union.  
LOUIS S. GERTEIS, FROM CONTRABAND TO FREEDMAN 12–13 (1973); MICHAEL VORENBERG, 
FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 24 (2001) (noting that General Butler had “offered to put down a rumored slave 
rebellion in Maryland”).  
 28.  Finkelman, supra note 2, at 364; GERTEIS, supra note 27, at 13. 
 29.  Finkelman, supra note 2, at 365. 
 30.  Id.; GERTEIS, supra note 27, at 13 (“Butler now argued that since Rebels in the Hampton 
area were using blacks to erect fortifications in support of the rebellion, the slave property in his 
possession was contraband, liable to confiscation by the laws of war.”). 
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for the Union cause.31  Eventually, Secretary of War Simon Cameron made 
Butler’s policy official War Department policy.32  Butler’s approach was 
incorporated into the First Confiscation Act.33 
The First Confiscation Act required the forfeiture of property used di-
rectly against the United States during the war.34  The forfeiture was not 
punishment; it was based on the misuse of the property.  The property was 
not merely commandeered; the property rights in the forfeited property 
were to be transferred to the United States.35  The Act stated that seized 
property would be condemned in the appropriate federal district court and 
                                                          
 31.  See CARNAHAN, supra note 25, at 84; Finkelman, supra note 2, at 365 (“Taking slaves 
away from Mallory and other Confederates served the dual purposes of depriving the enemy of 
labor while providing labor for the United States.”).  A number of Union generals grappled with 
how to address the issue of slavery.  In late 1861, General John C. Frémont, military commander 
in Missouri, declared martial law in Missouri and deemed free all rebel-owned slaves in the state.  
See MICHAEL BURLINGAME, LINCOLN AND THE CIVIL WAR 53 (2011) (discussing General Fré-
mont’s emancipation order in Missouri); VORENBERG, supra note 27, at 25 (2001) (noting General 
Frémont’s emancipation of slaves, subsequently revoked by Lincoln).  Similarly, in early 1862, 
General David Hunter, commander of U.S. forces in the Department of the South, declared martial 
law in Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina and deemed all slaves in such states to be free.  See 
Finkelman, supra note 2, at 375–76 (discussing General Hunter’s emancipation order); RANDALL, 
supra note 18, at 354 (discussing General Frémont’s general order on emancipation of slaves and 
General Hunter’s similar order); VORENBERG, supra note 27, at 25–26 (noting General Hunter’s 
emancipation of slaves in the Deep South, subsequently revoked by Lincoln).  President Lincoln 
countermanded both generals.  See BURLINGAME, supra, at 54 (noting that Lincoln distinguished 
between commandeering, which military officials can do, and confiscation, which only political 
branches can order); DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at 46 (noting Lincoln’s assertion that military offi-
cials may have the right to commandeer property for a short amount of time, but had no right to 
confiscate permanently); Finkelman, supra note 2, at 377 (noting Lincoln’s claim that he, as 
Commander in Chief, was the only authority that could order emancipation for military necessity); 
WILBUR, supra note 20, at 61–63 (discussing General Frémont and Hunter’s emancipation orders 
and Lincoln’s countermand of them).  
 32.  See CARNAHAN, supra note 25, at 85–86.  Indeed, by August 1861, Butler’s policy ap-
peared to have been normalized.  See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 366 (“The U.S. Army could em-
ploy any slaves who ran to its lines, provided they came from Confederate states.  This was not a 
general emancipation policy, and, indeed, the army was not supposed to deliberately attempt to 
free slaves.  But the army would not return fugitive slaves to masters in the Confederate states, 
even if the masters claimed to be loyal to the United States.”); WILBUR, supra note 20, at 60–61 
(noting that Secretary of War Cameron made General Butler’s refusal to return fugitive slaves 
War Department policy, but directed that the labor of slaves used be recorded).  Indeed, Secretary 
of War Simon Cameron attempted to go farther.  See BURLINGAME, supra note 31, at 60 (noting 
that Secretary of War Cameron had advocated emancipation and arming slaves in his 1861 annual 
report and was subsequently removed by Lincoln in January 1862); FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 
15–16 (1963) (discussing Secretary of War Cameron’s December 1861 suggestion to Lincoln that 
slaves be freed and armed, which Lincoln rejected and which may have helped precipitate Camer-
on’s removal from his post). 
 33.  CARNAHAN, supra note 25, at 86; ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 34 (2004).  
 34.  First Confiscation Act, supra note 25, § 1.  
 35.  Id. § 2. 
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sold for the benefit of the United States.36  It also provided the President 
with both the right and the obligation “to cause the [subject property] to be 
seized, confiscated, and condemned.”37 
The Act did not explicitly distinguish between human and non-human 
property; it did, however, treat the different types of property somewhat dif-
ferently.38  Non-human property was to be sold for the benefit of the United 
States.39  No provision for sale was made for slaves; instead, the Act merely 
indicated that slaveowners lost their rights in the slaves, and that the slave 
would be free of the obligation of labor to the previous owner.40  The First 
Confiscation Act did not clarify that slaves seized under the Act were to be 
emancipated.41  However, it also did not suggest that those slaves would be 
treated as U.S. government property, held or possibly sold at some later 
date.42 
The First Confiscation Act provided at least two incentives, one direct 
and one indirect.  The direct incentive was for Confederates to stop using 
their property in support of the war against the United States.43  The indirect 
incentive was for slaves to run toward Union lines.44  However ineffective 
the direct incentive may have been, the indirect incentive was effective.  
The tide of contraband continued throughout the Civil War, and the Union 
sought to gain advantages from the tide.45 
                                                          
 36.  Id. §§ 2, 3. 
 37.  Id. § 1.  
 38.  See id. (noting that all property used to support the insurrection was “lawful subject or 
prize and capture wherever found”). 
 39.  Id. § 3. 
 40.  Id. § 4. 
 41.  See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 357 (noting that the First Confiscation Act was not clear 
on whether forfeited slaves were free, “though this was the plain inference”).   
 42.  The First Confiscation Act did not foreclose the theoretical possibility that slaves could 
have been transferred to the United States, with the government owning the labor of slaves and the 
proceeds of the sale of slaves being used to fight the war.  Congress, however, showed no interest 
in having the United States own slaves and no interest in preserving slavery.  See FRANKLIN, su-
pra note 5, at 18 (“Despite the vagueness of the manner of forfeiture, Congress left no doubt that 
it was moving toward a policy that embraced emancipation under certain conditions.”). 
 43.  See First Confiscation Act, supra note 25, § 1. 
 44.  Like the war, the First Confiscation Act may have had the benefit of encouraging slaves 
to flee their masters and get to Union lines.  See Fabrikant, supra note 12, at 323 (“The [First Con-
fiscation Act] . . . sent a message that Union lines would be a safe haven for fugitive slaves.”); 
Finkelman, supra note 2, at 358 (“From the beginning of the war slaves escaped to U.S. army 
lines whether they assumed (usually correctly) that they would find freedom.”).   
 45.  See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 1865–1877, at 45 (1965) (“By 
1865, however, some 150,000 Negroes had escaped from slavery and had either joined the Union 
Army or performed military service by digging trenches and hauling supplies.”). 
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B.  The Second Confiscation Act 
By the time the Second Confiscation Act46 was signed on July 17, 
1862, the character of the Civil War had changed significantly.  The war 
had not ended quickly.  Union forces had not been as successful as some 
thought they should have been.47  Congress was not pleased with the prose-
cution of the war.48  More radical elements in Congress and in the country 
were pushing for action regarding slavery and emancipation.49  To some, 
the Second Confiscation Act was not bold enough.50  To others, it was far 
too bold.51 
The Second Confiscation Act was more complex than the First Confis-
cation Act. Its stated goal was “to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason 
and Rebellion, [and] to seize and confiscate the Property of Rebels.”52  Un-
like the First Confiscation Act, which focused on property used directly in 
support of the war effort against the United States, the Second Confiscation 
Act targeted all property of specific groups of people who were fighting or 
supporting the war against the United States.53  The Act had multiple aims.  
One was the confiscation of property.54  Another was the emancipation of 
rebel-owned slaves.55 
The first four sections of the Act focused on crimes.56  The first two 
sections focused on the punishment for those convicted of treason and for 
those convicted of being involved in the rebellion, including providing aid 
or comfort to the rebellion.57  The punishment for the criminal offense was, 
                                                          
 46.  An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and confiscate 
the Property of Rebels, and for other Purposes, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589 (1862) [hereinafter Second 
Confiscation Act]. 
 47.  For a discussion of the travails of the Union Army in early 1862, see DAVID HERBERT 
DONALD, LINCOLN 348–62 (1995); see also CARNAHAN, supra note 25, at 102–03. 
 48.  Congress eventually instituted oversight of the Civil War effort.  See FRANKLIN, supra 
note 5, at 17–18 (discussing Congress’s attempts to set war policy, including creation of the 
Committee on the Conduct of the War). 
 49.   See DONALD, supra note 47, at 364 (noting the numerous visitors Lincoln received urg-
ing emancipation); FARBER, supra note 6, at 153 (noting Congress’s shift toward emancipation).  
 50.  See HAROLD HOLZER, EMANCIPATING LINCOLN 31 (2012) (noting that abolitionists Wil-
liam Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips found the Second Confiscation Act inadequate). 
 51.  See id. (noting that conservatives thought the Act might alienate border states). 
 52.  Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46.  This is the title of the Second Confiscation Act.   
 53.  Id. § 5.  The Act could have gone farther.  See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 305–
06 (1870) (noting that wartime confiscation can reach all those residing in enemy territory wheth-
er or not they are sympathetic to the enemy government).  
 54.  Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 5. 
 55.  Id. § 9. 
 56.  See Miller, 78 U.S. at 308–10 (discussing the structure of the Second Confiscation Act).   
 57.  Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, §§ 1, 2. 
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in part, the seizure of the defendant’s property and the liberation of the de-
fendant’s slaves.58  The slaves need not have been used to support the Con-
federate war effort directly.  Rather, they merely needed to be the property 
of people who had supported the war effort and had been convicted of the 
relevant crime.59  Section three disqualified anyone convicted under the first 
two sections from holding federal office.60  Section four noted that the Act 
was not to interfere with treason prosecutions that arose before the Act was 
passed.61 
The Act’s civil provisions focused on the confiscation of property as a 
way to hasten the end of the war.62  Section five identified specific groups 
of people who were to have their property seized.63  The groups included 
officers of the army or navy of the Confederacy, high-level officers in the 
Confederate government, and lower-level officers in Confederate state gov-
ernments.64  Section five also applied to “any person who, owning property 
in any loyal State or Territory of the United States, or in the District of Co-
lumbia, shall hereafter assist and give aid and comfort to such rebellion.”65  
The President was charged with seizing subject property and using the pro-
ceeds from that property’s sale to support the army.66 
Section six of the Act authorized the President to designate an addi-
tional group of people whose property would be subject to seizure.67  The 
President was empowered to warn “any person within any State or Territory 
of the United States . . . being engaged in armed rebellion against the gov-
ernment of the United States, or aiding or abetting such rebellion” to stop 
supporting the rebellion and return their allegiance to the United States.68  If 
they did not do so within sixty days of the warning, their property would be 
subject to seizure.69  The President was obligated to seize the subject prop-
erty and use proceeds from the seizure.70  The Act provided for proceedings 
                                                          
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See id. § 1 (providing for liberation of all slaves owned by persons convicted of treason); 
id. § 2 (providing for liberation of all slaves owned by persons convicted of aiding rebel forces). 
 60.  Id. § 3. 
 61.  Id. § 4. 
 62.  See id. § 5 (noting that the purpose of providing the President the power to confiscate 
property was “to insure the speedy termination of the present rebellion”). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id. § 6. 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
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in rem —a mechanism that would speed condemnation proceedings by not 
requiring that the property’s owner be granted a personal hearing regarding 
his property prior to its condemnation.71  This mechanism was easier for the 
government to use than the mechanism provided in the First Confiscation 
Act, though confiscation through courts was not used particularly broadly 
pursuant to the First or Second Confiscation Act.72 
The Second Confiscation Act explicitly provided for the emancipation 
of slaves, unlike the First Confiscation Act.73  Congressmen understood the 
difference between confiscating slaves—either to stop their owners from 
using them to make war against the government or to punish them for mak-
ing war on the United States—and freeing those slaves.74  The nod toward 
emancipation was significant.  It made clear that confiscation was not mere-
ly about trading one set of masters for another, but that confiscation was 
meant to free slaves.75 
The substance of the emancipation portion of the Act is significant.  
The Act freed any slave who escaped into Union lines, was captured from 
his master, or was found in a place that had been occupied by rebel forces, 
if the slave’s master had engaged in rebellion or had “in any way give[n] 
aid or comfort” to the rebellion.76  The Act stated that those slaves “shall be 
deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude, and not 
again held as slaves.”77  The Act noted that a fugitive slave could be re-
turned to his owner, if the person claiming the fugitive swore an oath that 
the slave’s owner “ha[d] not borne arms against the United States in the 
present rebellion, nor in any way given aid and comfort thereto.”78 Mem-
                                                          
 71.  Id. § 7.  The in rem procedure troubled Lincoln and was part of his objection to the Sec-
ond Confiscation Act.  See Fabrikant, supra note 12, at 344 (“Lincoln found [the in rem provi-
sions] objectionable on the ground that they violated the Constitution by depriving persons of 
property beyond their lives.”).  He did not require, however, that the procedure be altered or re-
moved from the Act before signing the law.   
 72.  See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 288–92 (noting that confiscations were haphazard and 
did not produce much revenue for the U.S. Treasury). 
 73.  See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 9; see also Fabrikant, supra note 12, at 
340 (“[S]ection nine of the [Second Confiscation Act] expressly granted freedom, whereas the 
[First Confiscation Act] spoke only in terms of ‘forfeiture.’”). 
 74.  See WILSON, supra note 20, at 127 (noting that during the debate on the Second Confis-
cation Act congressmen briefly mentioned and rejected the possibility of treating slaves as forfeit-
ed property and selling them into the market).   
 75.  See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 358–59 (noting that slaves were treated differently than 
property under the Second Confiscation Act and did not appear subject to the onerous forfeiture 
procedures applicable to other property). 
 76.  Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 9. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. § 10; see also RANDALL, supra note 18, at 357 (noting that loyal slaveholders in Un-
ion states could recover their fugitive slaves until fugitive slave laws were repealed in mid-1864). 
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bers of the armed forces, however, could not be party to surrendering fugi-
tive slaves or returning fugitive slaves to their owners.79  Slaves who ran 
away to the Union lines were effectively free for the duration of the war. 
Lastly, the Second Confiscation Act authorized the President to use 
“persons of African descent as he may deem necessary and proper for the 
suppression of this rebellion,” freeing the President to use seized, freed, and 
escaped slaves in the military.80  Of course, President Lincoln may already 
have had the power to use whatever resources he needed to win the war un-
der his commander-in-chief power.81  After the Department of War sup-
ported General Butler’s declaration that runaway slaves were to be contra-
band of war and his use of the contrabands to support the war effort, the 
Second Confiscation Act could be deemed functionally superfluous on this 
point.  However, the additional congressional sanction to use blacks to sup-
port the Union cause was important if only to signal that Congress support-
ed the President on the issue.82 
The Confiscation Acts, taken together, allowed slaves used against the 
United States to be seized.83  They allowed slaves of rebels fighting against 
the United States to be freed.  They also allowed President Lincoln to de-
cide what additional people would be subject to having their property, in-
cluding slaves, confiscated or liberated.  Finally, the Confiscation Acts gave 
President Lincoln the authority to use confiscated and runaway slaves in the 
military in support of the war effort.  The two Confiscation Acts alone sug-
gest that Congress was tilting toward emancipation.84 
C.  Other Legislation 
Before the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, Congress passed 
additional legislation suggesting it was becoming more comfortable with 
emancipation.  Between the First Confiscation Act and the Second Confis-
cation Act, Congress passed legislation prohibiting military officials from 
                                                          
 79.  Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 10.  
 80.  Id. § 11. 
 81.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 82.  Unfortunately, the Second Confiscation Act was not solely focused on bringing slaves 
into the American polity.  It provided for the possible colonization of freed slaves to a country 
outside of the United States.  See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 12.  
 83.  The Acts were found to be constitutional. See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 313–
14 (1870) (“Upon the whole, then, we are of opinion the confiscation acts are not unconstitution-
al . . . .”). 
 84.  See FARBER, supra note 6, at 153 (2003)(“Congress began to move in the direction of 
emancipation with two Confiscation Acts, providing a mechanism to free the slaves of active re-
bels on a case-by-case basis.”); RANDALL, supra note 18, at 342 (suggesting that the Confiscation 
Acts were steps toward emancipation). 
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returning fugitive slaves to their masters, with President Lincoln signing the 
law on March 13, 1862.85  Congress also passed the Militia Act of 1862, 
which President Lincoln signed into law on July 17, 1862—the same day he 
signed the Second Confiscation Act.86  This Act authorized using blacks in 
the military;87 specifically, it granted freedom to any former slave who ren-
dered military service under the Act if that slave had been owned by some-
one who levied war on the United States or had given aid or comfort to en-
emies of the United States during the rebellion.88  In addition, the former 
slave’s mother, wife, and children would be free based on the former 
slave’s military service if the mother, wife, and children had been owned by 
someone who had levied war or given aid or comfort to the enemies of the 
United States.89  When taken together, the Acts suggest that the government 
did not intend to use military power to preserve slavery.  Rather, the gov-
ernment intended to emancipate many slaves who rendered service to the 
war effort. 
Congress also abolished slavery in areas where it had the clear power 
to do so.  Congress abolished slavery in the District of Columbia, with Pres-
ident Lincoln signing the law on April 16, 1862.90  Congress also abolished 
slavery in the U.S. territories, with President Lincoln signing the law on 
June 19, 1862.91  Neither of these actions, however, is the equivalent of 
                                                          
 85.  An Act to make an additional Article of War, ch. 40, 12 Stat. 354 (1862) [hereinafter Ad-
ditional Article of War].  The effect was to provide extra support to the war cause.  See Finkel-
man, supra note 2, at 366 (discussing contraband policy that essentially emancipated the slaves of 
rebel slaveholders and used the labor of slaves of loyal slaveholders (possibly to be compensated 
later upon claim by the loyal slaveholders)). 
 86.  The Militia Act of 1862, ch. 201, 12 Stat. 597 (1862). 
 87.  Id. § 12. 
 88.  Id. § 13; see also RANDALL, supra note 18, at 364 (discussing the Militia Act of 1862: “It 
was rather surprising that this law did not at the same time provide similar freedom for slave-
soldiers owned by loyal masters, with compensation to such masters, for it was widely recognized 
that no Negro who had served under the colors should be reenslaved.”).  This was fixed by an Act 
of February 24, 1864.  Id. at 364 n.46; DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at 40–41 (“By the act of February 
24, 1864, ‘all able-bodied male colored persons’ between the ages of twenty and forty-five were 
drafted for military service.  This law covered Negroes who were slaves as well as Negroes who 
were free.  Slaveowners in the Border States, which had not seceded, violently objected to the tak-
ing of their slaves without compensation. . . .  So the act provided that when a slave was taken into 
the Army from the Border States, his master should receive a sum of money (from $100 to $300) 
and the slave should become a free man.”). 
 89.  The Militia Act of 1862, supra note 86, § 13. 
 90.  D.C. Emancipation Act, ch. 54, 12 Stat. 376 (1862).  See also Fabrikant, supra note 12, at 
337 (“The D.C. Emancipation Act was the first federal law which granted immediate and uncondi-
tional freedom to any slave.”). 
 91.  An Act to secure Freedom to all persons within the Territories of the United States, ch. 
111, 12 Stat. 432 (1862) [hereinafter the Territories Act].  This law functionally nullified Dred 
Scott v. Sanford on the issue of slavery in the territories.  See TSESIS, supra note 33, at 35.   
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general emancipation, and may not be considered particularly radical.92  
The Republican platform on which Lincoln ran in 1860 favored the aboli-
tion of slavery in the territories,93 and some who favored compensated 
emancipation supported stopping the spread of slavery wherever possible.94  
Nonetheless, the aActs suggest that Congress was willing to move toward 
emancipation wherever possible, rather than toward appeasing slaveholders 
whenever possible.95 
D.  Implications 
Taken together, all of the laws mentioned above suggest that Congress 
was willing to emancipate slaves whenever it thought it was reasonable to 
support the war effort and wherever it thought it had the authority to do so.  
The latitude the laws explicitly gave President Lincoln suggests that he had 
significant power to affect slavery directly.  President Lincoln had been 
given the authority to seize property, to liberate slaves as a result, and to use 
black Americans militarily whenever appropriate to help suppress the rebel-
lion.96  President Lincoln was specifically given the authority and duty to 
confiscate and condemn property that had been used directly against the 
United States in support of the rebellion.97  President Lincoln was also spe-
cifically given the authority and duty to seize the property of certain groups 
of people living inside of the Confederate states, and of those living inside 
of loyal states if they supported or gave aid to the rebellion.98  Further, Pres-
ident Lincoln was specifically given the authority to issue a proclamation 
giving notice to people living in Confederate states that he could seize the 
property of people in those states who continued to aid or abet the rebel-
lion.99 
                                                          
 92.  Going farther might have been considered radical.  See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 358 
(“[A]ny national program for emancipation beyond the territories or the District of Columbia did 
not fit into any generally recognized interpretation of the Constitution.”); see also Rierson, supra 
note 18, at 839 (noting that Lincoln opposed the expansion of slavery into the territories, but did 
not campaign on the abolition of slavery in the states). 
 93.  See Andrew T. Hyman, The Due Process Plank, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 229, 230 
(2013) (discussing the antislavery plank of the Republican Party platform of 1860).  
 94.  President Lincoln could be counted in this group.  See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 21–22 
(discussing President Lincoln’s efforts in favor of compensated emancipation).  
 95.  See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 364 (noting the various ways in which Congress sought 
to and did emancipate slaves leading up to the Emancipation Proclamation).  
 96.  See supra Parts I.A–C. 
 97.  See supra Part I.A. 
 98.  See supra Part I.B. 
 99.  See supra Part I.B. 
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President Lincoln was also authorized to use people of African descent 
in the armed forces as he saw fit.100  President Lincoln could use now-
former slaves and free blacks to supplement the troops fighting the war, and 
presumably could encourage former slaves to become a part of the armed 
forces to help suppress the rebellion.101  This was a significant step, as some 
did not want to see African Americans become part of the armed forces, ei-
ther because they did not want to make the war about slavery or because 
they believed that the psychological effect black soldiers might have on the 
South would guarantee a prolonged or more savage rebellion.102  In the 
wake of being granted these powers and duties through legislation, Presi-
dent Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. 
II.  THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 
The Emancipation Proclamation was issued in the wake of significant 
legislation that supported the confiscation and emancipation of slaves as 
war policy and as general policy.103  The Emancipation Proclamation, how-
ever, is not generally considered an extension of congressional legislation; 
rather, it tends to be considered the action of President Lincoln alone, even 
though it lacked his signature linguistic flair.104  The full story is more 
                                                          
 100.  See supra Part I.C. 
 101.  See supra Part I.C. 
 102.  Interestingly, some Confederates would have liked to have seen slaves take up arms in 
support of the Confederacy.  See EMORY M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE NATION: 1861–1865, 
at 261–64 (1979) (discussing General Patrick Cleburne’s suggestion in early 1864 that the most 
loyal slaves be armed and promised freedom if they fought for the war’s duration, and noting its 
sound rejection at the time).  Indeed, eventually, the Confederacy did arm former slaves, but only 
after their masters freed them.  Rather than have them fight as slaves with the promise of emanci-
pation, the Confederacy eventually decided to allow some slaves to fight as free men.  See 
DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at 42–43 (noting the Confederacy’s eventual willingness to allow slaves 
to serve in the military in exchange for possible freedom); THOMAS, supra, at 290–96 (discussing 
Confederate move in late 1864 to arm and emancipate slaves whose masters allowed them to fight 
for the Confederacy). 
 103.  See supra Part I. 
 104.  The dryness of the Emancipation Proclamation may have been due to Lincoln’s desire to 
ensure its constitutionality.  See Adkins, supra note 6, at 245–46 (“Lincoln faced a serious consti-
tutional challenge to his Emancipation Proclamation from a number of prominent critics who con-
cluded Lincoln had no constitutional authority to issue such a document. . . . Lincoln had to care-
fully craft the proclamation into a dry legal document, denying to it Lincoln’s command of 
beautiful prose.”); BURLINGAME, supra note 31, at 68 (noting the “cold, legalistic language” of 
the Emancipation Proclamation); FARBER, supra note 6, at 154 (“The Emancipation Proclamation 
was not up to Lincoln’s usual standard of eloquence, but it said what it needed to say.”); Finkel-
man, supra note 2, at 351 (noting that stylistically, the Emancipation Proclamation was not Lin-
colnesque).  President Lincoln had reason to worry.  See JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF 
JUSTICE TANEY 222 (2006) (“Given the opportunity, there is no doubt that Taney would have de-
clared Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation unconstitutional.  He could have documented his 
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complex.  When commentators discuss the Emancipation Proclamation, 
they often refer primarily to the proclamation issued on January 1, 1863.105  
The Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, issued on September 22, 
1862,106 however, provides context for the final Emancipation Proclama-
tion.  Indeed, the final proclamation was arguably just a confirmation, in 
somewhat different language, of the preliminary proclamation.107 
The Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation was issued just after the 
Battle of Antietam.108  President Lincoln considered issuing the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation throughout much of the summer of 1862.109  Secretary of 
State Seward, however, advised President Lincoln that issuing the Emanci-
pation Proclamation during a difficult time for the Union army would make 
the Proclamation appear to be a desperate ploy.110  Consequently, Lincoln 
waited until after a Union victory.111  When issued, the Emancipation Proc-
lamation was welcomed by some and decried by others.112  It was, however, 
undeniably momentous. 
A.  The Preliminary Proclamation 
The Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation began with a statement of 
purpose declaring that President Lincoln, as President and Commander in 
Chief, planned to restore the Union.113  It then suggested that the rebellious 
states should rejoin the Union and accept gradual emancipation and the col-
                                                          
conclusion by citing his own judicial opinions in Strader v. Graham (1851), Dred Scott (1857), 
and Merryman (1861).”). 
 105.  Proclamation No. 17 (Emancipation Proclamation), 12 Stat. 1268 (Jan. 1, 1863) [herein-
after Emancipation Proclamation]. 
 106.  Proclamation No. 16 (Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation), 12 Stat. 1267 (Sept. 22, 
1862) [hereinafter Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation]. 
 107.  Compare Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 106, with Emancipation 
Proclamation, supra note 105. 
 108.  DONALD, supra note 47, at 374. 
 109.  See id. at 362–65 (discussing President Lincoln’s thinking during the summer of 1862 
about issuing an emancipation order). 
 110.  See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 43 (noting Secretary Seward’s concerns regarding the 
timing of the Emancipation Proclamation). 
 111.  Some did not consider Antietam to be much of a victory, but Lincoln thought it was good 
enough.  See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 46–47 (noting that the Union victory at Antietam was the 
trigger for issuing the Emancipation Proclamation); WILBUR, supra note 20, at 68–69 (discussing 
positive military results for the Union in early 1862 and noting that popular opinion had suggested 
that early 1862 had been a poor time for the Union’s military fortunes).  But see Adkins, supra 
note 6, at 248 (“That Lincoln issued the proclamation when he did is almost as inexplicable as his 
motives.  The Union had suffered a long series of military setbacks, and the war had been unex-
pectedly prolonged.”). 
 112.  See TSESIS, supra note 33, at 36 (discussing reactions to the Emancipation Proclamation). 
 113.  Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 106, para. 1. 
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onization of slaves.114  The preliminary Proclamation noted that, barring 
reconciliation, “all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated 
part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the 
United States shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free.”115  The pre-
liminary Proclamation indicated that the President would, on January 1, 
1863, indicate the areas of the United States to which the Proclamation 
would apply.116  It further stated that the government, including the mili-
tary, would recognize the freedom of slaves and do nothing to impede the 
exercise of their freedom.117  The preliminary Proclamation concluded with 
a pledge from President Lincoln that he would recommend, after the resto-
ration of the Union, that loyalists “be compensated for all losses by acts of 
the United States, including the loss of slaves.”118 
The preliminary Proclamation noted statutory support for its issu-
ance.119  It noted the law, passed March 13, 1862, prohibiting the military 
from helping to return fugitive slaves to their owners.120  It referenced sec-
tion nine of the Second Confiscation Act, which freed slaves of persons en-
gaged in rebellion or who had given aid or comfort to the rebellion, when-
ever those slaves came under the U.S. Army’s control.121  Finally, it noted 
section ten of the Second Confiscation Act, which barred the return of fugi-
tive slaves unless the person seeking the fugitive slave swore an oath that 
the owner of the slave had not participated in the rebellion or given aid or 
comfort to the rebellion, and which also reiterated that the military would 
not participate in the return of fugitive slaves.122  Lincoln suggested that 
these laws, coupled with his commander-in-chief power, provided the au-
thority to free all slaves in areas in rebellion against the United States.123  
                                                          
 114.  Id. para. 2. 
 115.  Id. para. 3.  
 116.  Id. para. 4. 
 117.  Id. para. 3. 
 118.  Id. para. 13. 
 119.  See CARNAHAN, supra note 25, at 108 (noting that President Lincoln referenced legisla-
tion likely to make the Emancipation Proclamation appear less radical and merely the result of 
carrying out Congress’s legislative commands); see also FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 48 (noting 
that obedience to the Second Confiscation Act and an Additional Article of War would lead to 
much emancipation and suggesting that the Emancipation Proclamation was a continuation of 
those acts). 
 120.  Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 106, paras. 5–8 (quoting an Addi-
tional Article of War). 
 121.  Id. para. 10.  
 122.  Id. para. 11.  
 123.  See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 48–49 (“As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, 
Lincoln referred to his military powers as the source of his authority to emancipate the slaves. . . . 
He hoped, finally, to bring about legislative and executive cooperation . . . .”). 
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The preliminary Proclamation was met with mixed reaction.124  The final 
Proclamation would be met with similar mixed reaction. 
B. The Final Proclamation 
By January 1, 1863, when the final Emancipation Proclamation was is-
sued, circumstances had changed.  The congressional elections of 1862 had 
occurred; President Lincoln’s Republican Party had been trounced.125  
Some anxiously awaited the issuance of the final Proclamation, not know-
ing whether President Lincoln would make the announcement.126  President 
Lincoln did not waver.  He issued the final Emancipation Proclamation 
freeing slaves in the areas of the Confederacy that remained in rebellion.127 
The final Proclamation confirmed the preliminary Proclamation.  
However, the final Proclamation focused somewhat more centrally on the 
President’s commander-in-chief power, stating that the Proclamation was “a 
fit and necessary war measure for suppressing the rebellion.”128  President 
Lincoln identified the areas in the United States not under the Union’s ef-
fective political or military control, deemed them to be in rebellion, and de-
clared that all slaves living in those areas were free.129  He stated:  
 I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said 
designated States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall 
be free; and that the Executive government of the United States, 
including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recog-
nize and maintain the freedom of said persons.130   
The Proclamation then noted that the then-former slaves could join the 
United States armed forces.131 
                                                          
 124.  See id. at 58–93 (discussing the favorable and unfavorable reactions to the preliminary 
Proclamation domestically and internationally). 
 125.  See Yoo, supra note 3, at 2015 (noting the 1862 midterm election results).  Indeed, some 
had wondered if the 1862 midterm elections would stop Lincoln from issuing the Emancipation 
Proclamation.  See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 86. 
 126.   See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 93 (discussing watch parties and anticipation of the issu-
ance of the final Emancipation Proclamation).  
 127.  Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 105. 
 128.  Id. para. 4.  Of course, much of the legislation passed prior to the Emancipation Procla-
mation reflected Congress’s views of what qualified as fit measures for ending the rebellion.  See 
supra Parts I.A–C.   
 129.  Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 105, paras. 4–6. 
 130.  Id. para. 6. 
 131.  Id. para. 8; see FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 104 (noting that the final Emancipation Proc-
lamation indicated that former slaves were to be welcomed into the armed forces, whereas the pre-
liminary Proclamation had not). 
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The Emancipation Proclamation could be thought to be a declaration 
that every slaveholder in the areas under rebellion was aiding and abetting 
the rebellion.  That would subject all of their property, including their 
slaves, to forfeiture.132  Given the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation’s 
suggestion that loyalists living in areas controlled by rebel forces might 
have claims after the war for compensation for destroyed property,133 how-
ever, it is unlikely that the final Emancipation Proclamation should be 
deemed to treat everyone in such areas as collaborating with the Confedera-
cy.  Rather than condemning the motives and actions of all persons living in 
areas in rebellion, the Emancipation Proclamation arguably merely subject-
ed to confiscation the human property of all subjects—loyal and disloyal—
living in areas in rebellion, without judgment.134 
The preliminary and final Proclamations were met with joy by some, 
but were not universally hailed by those who supported emancipation.135  
Although the Emancipation Proclamation stated United States war policy, 
declared free slaves in much of the United States, and indicated that nation-
al policy was to maintain the freedom of the newly freed slaves, it did not 
abolish slavery or free all slaves.136  Indeed, it did not free slaves in areas of 
the Confederacy that were under Union control.137  This reality led some to 
argue that the Proclamation only “freed” slaves in areas where the Union 
had no practical power to free slaves.138  President Lincoln countered that 
the Emancipation Proclamation, a war measure, could only free slaves in 
                                                          
 132.  The Court in Miller v. United States would have supported much more confiscation than 
the Emancipation Proclamation provided. 78 U.S. 268, 306 (1870) (noting that confiscation of all 
property of loyalists living in the Confederacy would have been constitutional).  
 133.  See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 134.  See supra notes 129–130 and accompanying text. 
 135.  See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 141–43 (noting that the Emancipation Proclamation was 
not all that abolitionists wanted, but was treated as momentous nonetheless); TSESIS, supra note 
33, at 36 (same). 
 136.  See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 137.  See id.  However, the practical effect of the Emancipation Proclamation was more com-
plex.  See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 114–15 (referring to an Emancipation Proclamation celebra-
tion in Norfolk, where the Proclamation did not technically free slaves: “This was an example, 
however, of what happened to slavery when Union forces won control of an area: slavery merely 
ceased to exist, the exceptions in the Emancipation Proclamation to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.”). 
 138.  See WILLIE LEE ROSE, REHEARSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION: THE PORT ROYAL 
EXPERIMENT 195–96 (1964) (“The Proclamation had in general emancipated only the slaves out-
side the grasp of the Federal armies and had gone to the lengths of specifically excluding from its 
liberating provisions the Negroes within [Union] lines . . . .”).  There were anomalies.  Slaves on 
coastal islands in South Carolina, who had been practically free and under Union Control since 
late 1861, were freed by the Emancipation Proclamation.  See id. at 196. 
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areas still in rebellion and not yet under Union control.139  As for the bigger 
issue of full emancipation, President Lincoln clung to the hope that states 
would accept gradual compensated emancipation.140  Indeed, he proposed 
gradual compensated emancipation in his December 1862 message to Con-
gress delivered between the issuance of the preliminary Proclamation and 
the final Proclamation.141  Whether the Emancipation Proclamation is 
thought to be a water glass half-empty or half-full, the more interesting 
question is whether the Executive’s duty to “take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed” provided Lincoln with the authority to start pouring water at 
all. 
III.  EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 
The President of the United States is vested with the executive authori-
ty of the federal government.142  The executive authority includes several 
duties and powers, including the commander-in-chief power and the duty to 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.143  Determining the bounda-
                                                          
 139.  Lincoln’s point was both legal and political.  Freeing slaves in areas under Union control 
would be akin to freeing slaves in free states in the Union. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL 
BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 298 (1982) (“The proclamation was a war 
measure directed against enemy resources.  Under the laws of war, the President and army had the 
right to seize these resources; but they had no constitutional power over slaves not owned by the 
enemy.”); VORENBERG, supra note 27, at 35 (“But many northerners doubted the constitutionality 
of emancipation in nonrebellious areas, and even more questioned whether black freedom would 
be constitutional after the war had ended.”); see also DOUGLAS, supra note 6, at vi (“The Emanci-
pation Proclamation, like the Magna Charta, has become a symbol of freedom and equality which 
was no part of it in the beginning.  Lincoln conceived of it as a military measure.  It indeed freed 
only some slaves, not all of them.”). 
 140.  Gradual compensation emancipation would have resolved issues of the Proclamation’s 
constitutionality that revolved around the Constitution’s Takings Clause.  See Finkelman, supra 
note 2, at 350 (suggesting that Emancipation Proclamation may have violated the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Takings Clause); see also Levinson, supra note 1, at 1149 (noting argument that, but for 
the Fourteenth Amendment, emancipation might be better thought to be a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment that would require compensation); Yoo, supra note 3, at 2014 (“The Emancipation 
Proclamation is usually studied as a question of the war powers of the national government, 
though it has also been studied as a question of whether it amounted to a taking of property requir-
ing compensation.”).  Some argue that the takings argument is a loser.  See FARBER, supra note 6, 
at 156 (“One possible argument is that [the Emancipation Proclamation] violated the takings 
clause.  But this argument should fail. . . . The government’s power to seize enemy property when 
required for military purposes predated the Constitution, and must be considered an implicit con-
dition on title to all real and personal property.”). 
 141.  See STAMPP, supra note 45, at 45 (noting Lincoln’s offer of gradual compensated eman-
cipation to states in late 1862 after the issuance of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation). 
 142.  U.S. CONST. art. II § 1. 
 143.  Id. at. §§ 2–3.  The scope of those powers can be elastic. See William G. Howell, War-
time Judgments of Presidential Power: Striking Down but Not Back, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1778, 
1788 (2009) (noting that robust commander-in-chief power can lead to extra-constitutional actions 
by the President). Opinion regarding the scope of executive power can vary, as was demonstrated 
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ries of executive power is a fascinating and difficult task.144  This Essay fo-
cuses specifically on the Take Care Clause and whether it may have author-
ized the Emancipation Proclamation. 
For the purposes of analyzing the Take Care Clause, all legislation 
passed by Congress before the Proclamation’s promulgation is assumed to 
be constitutional.  That assumption is necessary to isolate the take care is-
sue.  The Take Care Clause is triggered when legislation exists for the Pres-
ident to execute faithfully.145  Whether the President has faithfully executed 
the legislation arguably does not depend on whether the legislation is con-
stitutional.  Rather, it depends on whether the President’s take care power 
authorizes the actions taken pursuant to the underlying legislation.  Though 
important, an analysis of the constitutionality of the legislation enacted be-
fore the Emancipation Proclamation was issued would be lengthy and is 
outside of the scope of this brief Essay.  A brief discussion of the Take Care 
Clause is necessary before the Clause is considered in conjunction with the 
Emancipation Proclamation. 
                                                          
in 1860–1861.  See Yoo, supra note 3, at 2007–08 (contrasting President Lincoln’s self-professed 
constitutional authority to address secession with President Buchanan’s self-professed lack of con-
stitutional authority to do so).  
 144.  The most extensive attempt to map the limits of executive power as it interacts with the 
legislative power may have occurred in Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  Justice Jackson provided a structure for evaluating the 
proper breadth of executive power in relation to legislative power.  See id. at 635 (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or 
conjunction with those of Congress.”).  The Executive is most free to act when the President acts 
pursuant to an explicit congressional authorization.  Id. If the President’s act is unconstitutional in 
this setting, it is likely because the government as a whole cannot act as the President did.  Id. at 
636–37.  Thus, the Executive is more limited in acting when Congress has not spoken.  Congress 
and the President may have concurrent authority, but the distribution of that authority may be un-
clear.  Id. at 637.  The Executive is constrained to act exclusively based on his inherent executive 
powers when the President acts in contravention of expressed congressional policy.  Id.  In Dames 
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the Court praised Justice Jackson’s three-tiered power 
structure, but recognized that it did not easily resolve issues in actual cases.  See id. at 669 (“[I]t is 
doubtless the case that executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of [Jus-
tice Jackson’s] three pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit 
congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.”).  
 145.  See Levinson, supra note 1, at 1142 (“Even if the national government is deemed to have 
certain powers, the President still needs congressional authorization for his actions.  This, after all, 
is the heart of Youngstown Steel, which would have been an absolutely easy case had Congress 
authorized the [steel] seizure in advance.”). 
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A.  Take Care Clause 
The boundaries of the Take Care Clause, like the boundaries of execu-
tive power in general, are difficult to map.146  The Clause resides in section 
three of Article II of the Constitution with a number of other powers and 
duties given to the President.147  The Supreme Court has not given much 
guidance regarding the limits of the Take Care Clause.148  Consequently, 
the scope of the Clause remains unclear.149  Nonetheless, Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer150 (“Steel Seizure”) remains instructive on the reach 
of the Take Care Clause. 
The Steel Seizure case did not create clear boundaries for the Take 
Care Clause, but it did provide a few helpful signposts.  The Court reviewed 
President Truman’s seizure of the nation’s steel plants during the Korean 
War.151  Rather than allow a labor dispute at the plants to resolve itself, and 
possibly result in a disruptive strike, President Truman determined that he 
had the constitutional authority to seize the plants and keep them produc-
ing.152  President Truman argued that a strike at the plants would jeopardize 
national defense by disrupting the production of steel during the Korean 
War.153  The Court, however, determined that President Truman did not 
have the authority to seize the plants.154 
The Court analyzed President Truman’s claim that the Take Care 
Clause and the commander-in-chief power combined to provide the authori-
                                                          
 146.  For a discussion of the breadth of judicial and scholarly commentary on the scope of the 
Take Care Clause, see Norman W. Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Depart-
ment of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REV. 409, 430 n.75 (2011). 
 147.  See U.S. CONST. art. II § 3 (stipulating presidential duties to provide information to Con-
gress regarding the state of the union, convene and adjourn Congress, receive ambassadors and 
others, and commission officers of the United States, in addition to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed”).   
 148.  See Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381, 
409–10 (2001) (“Commentators generally agree that at least one purpose of the [Take Care] clause 
was to make it clear the president cannot arbitrarily suspend the enforcement of laws enacted by 
Congress.  Beyond this, however, relatively little is known about the original meaning of the Take 
Care Clause, and there similarly are relatively few cases in which the Supreme Court has dis-
cussed its breadth.”). 
 149.  See Michele Estrin Gilman, The President as Scientist-in-Chief, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
565, 577 (2009)(“Not only is [its] language vague, but the history surrounding the Take Care 
Clause is inconclusive because the Framers themselves disagreed over the proper scope of execu-
tive power. . . . This uncertainty creates an opening for Presidents to justify their domestic poli-
cymaking under the Take Care Clause.”). 
 150.  343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 151.  See id. at 582 (discussing the genesis of the seizure). 
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Id. at 583. 
 154.  Id. at 588–89. 
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ty sufficient to seize the steel plants.155  Rather than accept that the Presi-
dent had the inherent authority to seize the plants under the relevant circum-
stances, the Court noted that the President may act only pursuant to an ex-
plicit or implied grant of power from the Constitution or a statute.156  After 
dispensing with the argument that the commander-in-chief power author-
ized the seizure,157 the Court addressed the content of the Take Care Clause.  
The Court viewed the Take Care Clause as a limited grant of power to the 
President; it allows the President to shape the executive response to legisla-
tion, but does not allow the President to invade the legislative power that 
the Constitution assigns to Congress.158  The Legislature sets policy; the 
Executive implements that policy.159  In sum, when Congress has explicitly 
stated the policy it wants followed, the President is limited in following a 
different path.  Conversely, when the President follows Congress’s lead, the 
President will have more latitude in crafting a policy response to a situation.  
The Steel Seizure Court provided little additional analysis of the Take Care 
Clause. 
In the wake of the Court’s limited discussions of the Take Care 
Clause, the Clause can be considered to provide both a duty requiring the 
Executive to enforce the law as the legislation demands and a license allow-
ing the President to interpret statutes in the context of determining how to 
enforce them.160  What the Take Care Clause allows the President to do de-
pends on how broad the President’s job is conceived to be.  If the Presi-
dent’s job with respect to executing the law is to do only what legislation 
                                                          
 155.  Id. at 587. 
 156.  Id. at 585 (“The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act 
of Congress or from the Constitution itself.  There is no statute that expressly authorizes the Presi-
dent to take possession of property as he did here.  Nor is there any act of Congress to which our 
attention has been directed from which such a power can fairly be implied.”). 
 157.  Id. at 587 (noting that the seizure of mills is not a military matter). 
 158.  Id. (“In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are 
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.  The Constitution limits his func-
tions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of 
laws he thinks bad.”). 
 159.  Id. at 588.  
 160.  See FARBER, supra note 6, at 128–29 (noting the difficulty in using the Take Care Clause 
to extend presidential authority because “[i]t is phrased as a duty rather than a grant of power”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1471 
(1988) (“The ‘take Care’ clause, however, is a duty, not a license.  The clause requires the Presi-
dent to carry out the law as enacted by Congress.”); see also Thomas P. Crocker, Presidential 
Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1551, 1576 (2011) (“The Take Care 
Clause’s meaning is not without its own ambiguity. Is it an assignment of power, as some argue, 
or a designation of a duty, as many others argue?”).  Indeed, some argue that the clause restrains 
the President.  See id. at 1554 (arguing that the need to take care that laws are faithfully executed 
is a restraint on the President).  
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commands the President to do, the Take Care Clause will be viewed nar-
rowly.  Conversely, if the President’s job is to execute legislative policy re-
flected by all of federal law, the latitude the Take Care Clause provides can 
be viewed expansively.  Even when viewed expansively, however, the 
Clause will always have limits.161  The President can only interpret the law 
in the context of executing it.162  The President cannot interpret the law so 
aggressively that the President functionally legislates.163  Where the line be-
tween executing the law and legislating resides, however, is difficult to de-
termine. 
Of course, the President must interpret statutes to enforce them.  Even 
at its most restrictive, the Take Care Clause presumably allows the Presi-
dent to interpret a statute to determine what the President is required to do 
under the statute.164  If treated more expansively, the Take Care Clause may 
allow the President to interpret the maze of federal law to determine how 
the law should best be executed consistent with congressional intent.165  
                                                          
 161.  See supra note 158 and accompanying text.  Nonetheless, Lincoln viewed his commis-
sion broadly.  See Adkins, supra  note 6, at 243 (“Lincoln construed his oath and the ‘take care’ 
clause to mean that he was responsible for preserving the Union.”). 
 162.  See Neomi Rao, The President’s Sphere of Action, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 527, 546 
(2009) (“To faithfully execute the laws, the President must ensure that various statutory policies 
and directives work together to create coherent government action. Generating such coherence 
from our myriad laws will often require detailed and sometimes creative interpretation.”); Yoo, 
supra note 3, at 1947 (“[The Constitution] grants perhaps the most significant executive power, 
that of taking ‘Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ in the president alone.  The Take Care 
Clause makes the president responsible for enforcing federal law, which implies an ancillary au-
thority to interpret it in the course of enforcement.”). 
 163.  See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (noting that the Take Care Clause “al-
lows the President to execute the laws, not make them”); FARBER, supra note 6, at 129 (“The 
‘take care’ clause presumably does give the president some discretion in implementing the laws. 
But it arguably undermines inherent executive power by stressing the president’s subordinate role 
with respect to the lawgivers.”); Spaulding, supra note 146, at 437 (“However we read the Take 
Care Clause, it cannot mean that the President is free to execute his will rather than the laws.”).  
Some argue that any grant of power the Take Care Clause provides is not broad.  See Crocker, 
supra note 160, at 1576 (“The Supreme Court has never provided a full exposition of the [take 
care] clause, and certainly not one that establishes a robust grant of power.”).  
 164.  See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 165.  The take care power that is being suggested here is not in the form of an emergency pow-
er, but in the form of a typical interpretation of legislation that has been duly passed.  There is an 
argument, however, that the Take Care Clause provides the President emergency powers that are 
not explicitly noted in the Constitution.  See Thaddeus Hoffmeister, An Insurrection Act for the 
Twenty-First Century, 39 STETSON L. REV. 861, 883 n.132 (2010).  How broad that power may be 
is subject to debate. See Howell, supra note 143, at 1789–90 (noting that the Take Care Clause 
does not explicitly distinguish between peacetime and wartime, but effectively can provide the 
President with additional power given that many statutes provide the President with additional 
power during emergencies).  However, wartime does not expand the Executive’s power into the 
legislative realm.  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (“The 
 2013] LINCOLN AND EXECUTIVE POWER 123 
Any interpretation by the Executive must be faithful to the statutes, but a 
reasonable amount of interpretive latitude may allow the President to em-
bed the President’s policy preferences—consistent with Congress’s prefer-
ences—in the interpretation.166  Whether the President has acted consistent-
ly with the Take Care Clause may depend on how clearly the President’s 
vision tracks Congress’s vision for a particular issue.167  This is important in 
considering how the Take Care Clause may have authorized the issuance of 
the Emancipation Proclamation. 
B.  The Take Care Clause and Emancipation Proclamation 
Whether the Take Care Clause authorized President Lincoln to issue 
the Emancipation Proclamation would seem to depend in part on whether, 
in issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, President Lincoln lagged or out-
paced Congress.  The former view suggests that the Emancipation Procla-
mation merely pushed the emancipation issue that Congress had set in mo-
tion with its prior legislation.168  If emancipation was clearly coming, the 
Emancipation Proclamation could be thought to be a mere continuation of 
congressional policy that was likely within the President’s executive author-
ity.169  Conversely, the Emancipation Proclamation arguably was a bold 
step toward freedom well beyond what Congress had authorized or contem-
plated. If the Emancipation Proclamation was a break with or a radical de-
parture from congressional action, it is less likely to have been within the 
President’s take care authority.170  Ironically, the Emancipation Proclama-
                                                          
Founders of this Nation entrusted the law making power to the Congress alone in both good and 
bad times.”).   
 166.  See Sunstein, supra note 160, at 1471 (“[The Take Care Clause] does accord to the Presi-
dent—and no one else—the authority to control the execution of the law when Congress has not 
spoken, and that authority will involve a measure of discretion.”).  Some suggest that any discre-
tion allowed should be exercised carefully.  See Crocker, supra note 160, at 1558 (suggesting that 
duties to take care and faithfully execute the laws “places virtue at the center of the president’s 
powers”). 
 167.  See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678, 680 (1981) (“Although we have 
declined to conclude that the IEEPA or the Hostage Act directly authorizes the President’s sus-
pension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor of Congress’ legisla-
tion in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting alone or at least with the 
acceptance of Congress. . . .  Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has im-
plicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement.”.). 
 168.  See FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 20–21 (noting that Congress was in front of Lincoln on 
emancipation issues and that Lincoln held Congress back). 
 169.  The Emancipation Proclamation could have been thought to implement the Second Con-
fiscation Act in part, especially because there had been confusion about how the military was to 
enforce the Act.  See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 361 (“Neither the military authorities nor the 
courts had any clear understanding as to how they were to carry out the confiscation law in its re-
lation to the liberation of slaves.”). 
 170.  See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text. 
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tion’s value as proof of President Lincoln’s greatness may be inversely pro-
portional to its apparent constitutionality.171 
An examination of the constitutionality of the Emancipation Proclama-
tion requires consideration of the legislation that preceded it.  At the time 
the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, Congress had legislated differ-
ently with respect to three groups of slaves.172  The first group consisted of 
slaves held by disloyal masters.173  The second group consisted of slaves 
who escaped or ended up behind Union lines during the war, but were held 
by loyal masters.174  The third group consisted of slaves who never escaped 
through Union lines during the war, but were held by loyal masters.175  
Consequently, though the Emancipation Proclamation provided a blanket 
emancipation of slaves in Confederate-held areas, practically, it is three 
separate Emancipation Proclamations.  The Proclamation’s emancipation of 
some slaves is on very solid constitutional ground.176  Its emancipation of 
other slaves may be on shakier constitutional ground, at least when the 
President’s take care authority is viewed as the only constitutional support 
for the President’s executive authority to issue the Emancipation Proclama-
tion.177 
1.  Slaves of Disloyal Masters 
Slaves who were held by disloyal masters arguably were free as soon 
as President Lincoln issued the final Emancipation Proclamation.178  Under 
the Second Confiscation Act, the property of rebels was subject to seizure 
and forfeiture after the President issued a proclamation warning persons in 
areas under rebellion to stop supporting the rebellion and declare allegiance 
                                                          
 171.  Some commentators have suggested that the Emancipation Proclamation was consistent 
with the exercise of executive authority as structured in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579 (1952), while others disagree. Compare FARBER, supra note 6, at 156 (“Whereas in 
Steel Seizure, Congress had clearly refused to authorize such seizures, no such history existed in 
Lincoln’s case.  Emancipation was consistent with the general trend of congressional action 
against slavery, including the Confiscation Acts.”), with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 
at 685 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (“The most striking action of President Lincoln was the Emanci-
pation Proclamation, issued in aid of the successful prosecution of the War Between the States, 
but wholly without statutory authority.”) .   
 172.  See infra Parts III.B.1–3. 
 173.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 174.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
 175.  See infra Part III.B.3. 
 176.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 177.  See infra Parts III.B.2–3. 
 178.  See supra notes 129–130 and accompanying text.  Practically, slaves of disloyal masters 
may not have been free until they crossed Union lines.  
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to the United States.179  The Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation served 
as notice to persons living in areas under rebellion.180  The property of re-
bels was subject to seizure when the final Emancipation Proclamation was 
issued, as the Second Confiscation Act placed a duty on President Lincoln 
to seize property subject to forfeiture.181  Section nine of the Second Con-
fiscation Act makes clear that slaves of rebels who physically came under 
United States military control were free.182  The easiest way for the slaves 
of rebels to become emancipated was to cross Union lines.  Section eleven 
of the Second Confiscation Act authorized President Lincoln to use persons 
of African descent however necessary to suppress the rebellion.183  Conse-
quently, the Emancipation Proclamation notes that newly freed slaves 
would be welcomed into the armed services.184  Given congressional direc-
tives, the Proclamation can be deemed an attempt to drive slaves already 
subject to forfeiture toward Union lines as a way to add men who could 
help the Union suppress the rebellion.185  President Lincoln would appear to 
have been authorized under his responsibility to take care that the Second 
Confiscation Act be faithfully executed to issue the Emancipation Procla-
mation and apply it to the slaves of disloyal persons. 
2.  Runaway Slaves of Loyal Masters 
President Lincoln’s authority to apply the Emancipation Proclamation 
to slaves who were held by loyal masters living in the Confederacy, but 
who escaped and ran behind Union lines, is trickier to address.  The Second 
Confiscation Act did not address how to treat slaves who ended up behind 
Union lines but were owned by loyalists.  The Act suggested that under cer-
tain circumstances the slaves of loyalists who crossed borders and were 
found in non-seceding states could be sent back to their loyalist owners.186  
Slaves who crossed Union military lines, but were owned by loyalist own-
ers, however, could not be sent back to their loyalist masters by the mili-
                                                          
 179.  See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 6.  
 180.  See Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 106, para. 3.  Indeed, the slaves 
of disloyal masters who lived in loyal states were also subject to confiscation.  See Second Confis-
cation Act, supra note 46, § 5.  
 181.  Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 6. 
 182.  Id. § 9. 
 183.  Id. § 11. 
 184.  Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 105, para. 8. 
 185.  See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 381–82 (noting that the Emancipation Proclamation 
brought many slaves into Union lines, with attendant opportunities for service and accompanying 
logistical problems); see also FRANKLIN, supra note 5, at 69, 71–73 (noting the concern at the 
time that the preliminary Proclamation was the equivalent of a call to slave insurrection). 
 186.  See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 10. 
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tary, per Congress’s Additional Article of War187 and the Second Confisca-
tion Act.188  In addition, the Second Confiscation Act allowed President 
Lincoln to use freed or fugitive slaves to suppress the rebellion.189  The 
Emancipation Proclamation does not appear to be required by the legisla-
tion passed before its issuance, but it may help resolve a problem that was 
created or exacerbated by such legislation. 
The legislation enacted before the Emancipation Proclamation was is-
sued complicated a practical problem for military commanders in the field.  
Since the beginning of the war, military commanders had to address the is-
sue of fugitive slaves who crossed Union lines.190  After the Confiscation 
Acts were passed, some of the fugitive slaves were essentially free because 
they had been used in support of the rebellion or were owned by rebel mas-
ters.191  Conversely, other slaves arguably were not free because their mas-
ters had remained loyal to the Union.192  The commanders in the field had 
little or no way of knowing who was subject to the First Confiscation Act 
and who was not.193  Indeed, many commanders may not have cared who 
was technically free and who was not given that the commanders could not 
return fugitive slaves to their masters as of March 1862.194  In addition, un-
der War Department policy as of late 1861 and under the Second Confisca-
tion Act, the fugitive slaves—free or not—could be used to do tasks that 
regular soldiers would have had to do otherwise.195  Taken together, the 
various enactments suggest that commanders were authorized to use, and 
should have used, whichever people of African descent arrived behind Un-
ion lines or in Union encampments in support of the war effort. 
                                                          
 187.  See Additional Article of War, supra note 85. 
 188.  See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 10.  According to Miller v. U.S., 78 U.S. 
268 (1870), Congress could have subjected the property of all residents of the Confederacy, loyal 
or disloyal, to confiscation.  Id. at 310–12.  Whether legislation directed or allowed President Lin-
coln to do so is a different question.  
 189.  Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 9. 
 190.  See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 366 (noting that in the wake of General Butler’s decision 
to treat runaway slaves as contraband, President Lincoln changed government policy so that slaves 
from Confederate states would not be returned, but the labor of those slaves would be recorded so 
that loyal masters might be compensated later).  
 191.  See supra notes 37, 76 and accompanying text. 
 192.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 193.  See GERTEIS, supra note 27, at 17 (noting the inability of military officers to determine 
the status of slaves). 
 194.  See Additional Article of War, supra note 85.  The contraband issue was serious.  See 
MCPHERSON, supra note 139, at 298 (“Already [by the time the Emancipation Proclamation was 
signed] 100,000 or more contrabands within Union lines in Tennessee, Louisiana, Virginia, and 
elsewhere were free by the realities of war.”). 
 195.  See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 11 (authorizing use of slaves who were 
sufficiently fit for military service). 
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The Emancipation Proclamation could be read as a recognition that 
slaves of loyalists living in the Confederacy would continue to reach Union 
lines, would be put to work for the Union cause, and almost certainly would 
not be re-enslaved after the war.196  Congress’s arc toward emancipation 
makes it difficult to imagine that slaves who served as Union soldiers or 
otherwise in support of the Union cause would be returned to their loyalist 
masters after the war.197  Indeed, President Lincoln’s mention in the Prelim-
inary Emancipation Proclamation of future attempts to suggest compensa-
tion for those loyalists who lost property in the war could be relevant; it 
suggests a recognition that loyalists might be compensated for slaves lost or 
possibly commandeered during the war, but that those slaves might not be 
returned.198  Thus, the Emancipation Proclamation’s grant of freedom to 
slaves of loyalists who might escape to Union lines could be viewed as an 
implied exercise of the President’s duty to take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed.  The Proclamation may be justified as a preemptive way to 
address a problem that federal law helped create but did not solve: the status 
of fugitive slaves of loyalists behind Union lines who could be used for mil-
itary purposes and would not be returned to their loyalist owners after the 
war. 
This construction of the President’s take care power suggests that a 
president may or must attempt to faithfully execute all of the laws, as best 
as possible.  That is, when faced with a tangle of laws that creates a practi-
cal nightmare, the President may be allowed to choose a path that best ad-
dresses the practical problems that the legislation has created or exacerbat-
ed.  The power to choose the best path would be implied by the more 
general duty to take care to faithfully execute all of the laws.  The Emanci-
pation Proclamation’s preemptive freeing of the slaves of both loyalists and 
rebels appears to go beyond the legislation Congress had passed before the 
Emancipation Proclamation was issued.  However, if the Proclamation is 
considered an attempt to address the practical problem of contraband fugi-
tive slaves that commanders in the field had seen, and likely would continue 
to see, because of legislation that tilted toward encouraging fugitive slaves 
to find refuge behind Union lines and emancipating for former slaves who 
                                                          
 196.  See STAMPP, supra note 45, at 45 (noting that at least by 1865, President Lincoln be-
lieved that fugitive slaves who had performed some service for the Union should not be re-
enslaved).   
 197.  By 1864, slaves who served in the armed forces were freed whether they had been owned 
by loyal or disloyal owners.  See supra note 88. 
 198.  See Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 106, para. 13. 
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served in the U.S. armed forces, the Proclamation could be considered well 
within the Executive’s take care authority.199 
3.  Slaves of Loyal Masters Who Never Escaped to Union Lines 
The last group of slaves ostensibly freed by the Emancipation Procla-
mation—slaves who were owned by loyalists and remained in Confederate-
controlled areas—is the most difficult group to emancipate constitutionally 
based solely on the President’s take care authority.200  The property of loy-
alists living in Confederate states had largely been protected under the rele-
vant legislation.201  In addition, the emancipation of the slaves who stayed 
in the Confederacy and were owned by loyalists, though a good and just 
idea, does not appear to resolve any pressing problem created or exacerbat-
ed by legislation.202  A reading of the President’s take care authority that 
provides the President the implied power to go beyond the text of legisla-
tion to do what was necessary to effectuate the purposes of a statute’s text 
might not cover the group of slaves at issue, as the law in place when the 
Emancipation Proclamation was issued appeared to protect the property of 
loyalists living behind Confederate lines.203  However, a reading of the take 
care authority that allows the President to execute policy based on a broader 
vision of the legislation that Congress passed on a general topic might allow 
the Emancipation Proclamation to cover the group of slaves at issue. 
The mass of legislation that Congress had passed regarding slaves, 
slavery, and the prosecution of the war provided President Lincoln with 
significant latitude and authority to confiscate and seize rebel property, 
emancipate slaves, use former slaves in the armed forces, and be aggressive 
in suppressing the rebellion.  If the President’s take care authority is aimed 
                                                          
 199.  Practically, how Congress had handled the fugitive slave issue may have forced the 
emancipation issue.  See RANDALL, supra note 18, at 356 (“This fugitive slave question offers an 
excellent example of the manner in which the unavoidable incidents of a war over a vastly extend-
ed front with a slaveholding power inevitably forced upon the Government the question of eman-
cipation.”). 
 200.  Under the President’s commander-in-chief power, confiscating the slaves of residents of 
the Confederacy would have been allowed.  See The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 
U.S. (2 Black) 635, 649–52 (1863) (holding that property of all persons residing within rebellious 
states may be treated as enemy property, regardless of personal allegiance, and thus is subject to 
capture); FARBER, supra note 6, at 138–41 (discussing the Prize Cases); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
The Emancipation Proclamation and the Commander in Chief Power, 40 GA. L. REV. 807, 814–
16 (2006) (discussing the Prize Cases).  President Lincoln was reluctant to confiscate the property 
of loyalists without compensation, but he arguably had the power to do so.  
 201.  See Second Confiscation Act, supra note 46, § 5 (limiting confiscation to property of dis-
loyal persons). 
 202.  See id. 
 203.  See id. 
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at the general arc of legislation rather than at particular pieces of legislation, 
the President’s take care authority might cover the remaining group of 
slaves emancipated by the Emancipation Proclamation.  That would appear 
to be a stretch.  Such a vision of the Take Care Clause might seem sensible 
in the context of emancipating slaves during the Civil War, but might not be 
sensible in other contexts.204 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Emancipation Proclamation is fully justified under the President’s 
broad executive authority.  The commander-in-chief power alone justifies 
it.  The Emancipation Proclamation, however, may also be largely justified 
solely by the Take Care Clause, which requires that the President take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.  The legislation Congress passed prior 
to the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation required slaves of rebels 
to be emancipated, allowed fugitive slaves to be used in the Union war ef-
fort, and suggested that slaves should be freed wherever Congress was al-
lowed to free them.  Against this backdrop, the Emancipation Proclama-
tion’s emancipation of all of the slaves in areas under Confederate control 
arguably follows from prior legislation. 
Functionally, the Emancipation Proclamation freed three groups of 
slaves.  The first group-–slaves of disloyal owners—was already subject to 
confiscation and emancipation under the Second Confiscation Act.  The 
emancipation of those slaves can be justified even with reference to a fairly 
narrow take care power.  The second group—slaves who ran to Union lines 
but were owned by loyal masters—was available for military use in the Un-
ion army based on prior legislation, could not be returned to their slave-
holders by the military, and may have been unlikely to have been returned 
to their masters after the war even if the Thirteenth Amendment had not 
been passed.  Taken together, the relevant legislation suggested that those 
slaves would remain free, but did not explicitly command such.  As im-
portantly, members of the second group of slaves could not be easily distin-
guished from members of the first group of slaves.  The emancipation of the 
second group of slaves could be justified by a vision of the Executive’s take 
care power that allows the Executive to plot the best way to execute laws 
that, if applied strictly, would create serious problems for government offi-
cials charged with carrying out the congressional policy suggested by the 
legislation.  The third group—slaves who did not run to Union lines and 
                                                          
 204.  See FARBER, supra note 6, at 141 (“A legal state of war would limit the rights of neutral 
nations to conduct trade with the South, end the ability of noncombatant Southerners to invoke 
their normal rights as American citizens, and allow combatant Southerners to be treated as prison-
ers of war rather than criminals or traitors.”). 
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were owned by loyalist owners residing in the Confederacy—did not appear 
to be subject to confiscation before the Emancipation Proclamation was is-
sued.  The Emancipation Proclamation could be authorized with respect to 
the third group of slaves if the President’s take care authority is viewed 
broadly enough to allow the President to execute broad legislative policy 
suggested by legislation, for example, Congress’s pro-emancipation and an-
ti-slavery Civil War policy, rather than limited to executing commands em-
bedded in particular legislative enactments. 
The boundaries of the Take Care Clause are not clear.  Consequently, 
whether President Lincoln was authorized to issue the Emancipation Proc-
lamation based solely on the Take Care Clause is a puzzle subject to vigor-
ous debate and discussion.  However, given the ever present specter of ex-
panding executive power generally, the puzzle is worthy of more time and 
thought than has yet been spent. 
